Abstract: Regulatory constraints imposed on insurance companies can induce a collective need to divest downgraded bond issues. Upon a downgrade, corporate bond dealers act as middlemen and provide liquidity by absorbing temporary order-flow imbalances. Limited access to inventory financing can temporarily limit dealers' inventory and risk-bearing capacities and, at least in the short run, impair liquidity provision. Using insurance company transaction data, I investigate if dealer funding constraints (as proxied by their CDS spreads) amplify price declines and stall subsequent reversals of downgraded bonds. I find that bonds handled by constrained dealers (with higher CDS spreads) are associated with substantially larger and abrupt declines and slower reversals of abnormal returns around a downgrade.
Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of corporate bond dealers' financial constraints on bond price pressures in downgraded corporate bond issues held by insurance companies. Insurers constitute an important group of investors in corporate bond markets holding over a quarter of all outstanding corporate debt. At the same time, they operate under regulations that either prohibit or impose large capital requirements on their holdings of non-investment grade bonds.
1 As documented by Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011) , a rating downgrade from investment-grades to speculative grades (a rating of BB+ or below) can induce insurance companies to immediately and collectively divest at least part of their holdings in downgraded bond issues. The forced selling of corporate bond issues temporarily generates substantial order flow imbalances.
2 Upon a downgrade, corporate bond dealers provide liquidity by temporarily absorbing these order-flow imbalances before re-selling the positions to other investors. Dealers' ability take the role of middlemen is closely linked to the ease with which they can establish and maintain inventory positions. Speculative bond inventories hold substantial price risks, require higher risk-based capital charges, and are costly in terms of financing. As a dealer's cost of holding risky inventory increases, she can become increasingly hesitant to take on additional inventory, and may quote smaller quantities at less attractive prices. As such, regulatory induced selling pressures in downgraded bond issues provides an appropriate environment in which to study the impact of dealers' financial constraints during fire sales. Despite dealers' crucial role in corporate bond markets, we still know relatively little about how their financial constraints impact the provision of liquidity during times of intense selling pressures. Up to now, data limitations, in particular the lack of dealer identities, have hampered efforts to link bond dealers' financial constraints with their liquidity provision. To empirically test whether dealers' financial constraints affect the price pressure around a downgrade, I construct a dataset of all the corporate bond downgrades and insurance companies' trade records from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) from 2002 to 2014 while identifying the dealer behind each individual bond transaction.
In this paper, I show empirically that dealers' financial constraints (as proxied by their CDS spreads) have a statistically and economically meaningful negative impact on the bond price patterns surrounding a downgrade. By focusing on the role of dealers in fire sales, the paper makes two contributions: First, I find a striking pattern of large price drops and partial reversals around the downgrade, similar to the patterns in related studies (e.g., Ellul et al. (2011) , Han and Wang (2014) , Spiegel and Starks (2016) ) Importantly, these return patterns are markedly different for bonds handled by unconstrained versus bonds handled by constrained dealers. The latter experience substantially larger return deviations, as exhibited by more negative and abrupt declines in abnormal returns, which appears to be consistent with the idea that dealers' financial constraints limit their risk-bearing capacities. Second, in a bond-level cross-sectional analysis I find that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of a bond's volume-weighted average dealer CDS spread over the median dealer CDS spread at the time is associated with a significant negative average (median) CAR of 3.55% (1.71%). I find the negative impact on CARs to be stronger when measuring dealer constraints at the issuer instead of the bond-level. Comparing the pre-with the postevent window, the empirical evidence suggests that the negative impact of dealers' inventory constraints on CARs is stronger in the weeks following the downgrade. That is, as selling pressures peak and dealer inventory limits become binding. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that higher inventory costs limit dealers' risk-bearing capacities making them less willing to establish growing inventory imbalances without substantial price markdowns. All these findings are robust to controlling for various bond, market, and dealer characteristics as well as when using median regressions. The empirical approach in this paper follows an event study methodology, particularly using matching portfolios as proposed by Bessembinder et al. (2009) and further adapted by Ederington et al. (2015) .
3 Arguably, the latter can be understood as a simplified special case of the approach recently proposed by Spiegel and Starks (2016) . It is a simplification to the extent that I do not explicitly estimate daily returns using a dummy variable approach. And, it is a special case in the sense that bond returns contributing to a portfolio on a particular trading day are generally equally-weighted. In comparison, I am matching based on a bond's rating and its time-to-maturity while Spiegel and Starks (2016) group on a bond's yield and its industry classification. Importantly, as in Spiegel and Starks (2016) , the approach yields an average univariate regression coefficient of one when regressing bond returns on the matching portfolios. Using cross-sectional regressions, I relate bonds' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around a downgrade to the volume-weighted average CDS spread of the five most-active dealers per bond and issuer respectively. In doing so, I control for various bond, market, and other dealer characteristics. Quantifying dealers' financial constraints requires dealer identities. The choice for dealers' CDS spreads as proxies for their inventory constraints is motivated by the following argument: In the process of liquidity provision dealers establish inventory positions for which they strongly rely on short-term collateralized loans (so-called "repos") . 4 This dependence on short-term funding exposes dealers to debt runs, rollover risk, and wider financial contagion. Since direct measures of dealers' effective short-term funding costs are either difficult to come by or not available at all, 5 I make use of their credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which exhibit variation across dealers and represent a plausible indicator of credit risk based on which risk managers and lenders evaluate financing terms, credit lines, and position limits. To the extent that adverse changes in borrower credit risk increase monitoring concerns and prompt lenders to demand higher interest or curtail lending (Calomiris and Kahn (1991) ; Rochet and Tirole (1996) ) dealer CDS spreads appear as a suitable proxy for dealer-specific changes in funding costs.
My work draws on theoretical models of dealers' market making behavior. Standard market microstructure models with inventory frictions have (risk-averse) dealers absorbing temporary imbalances in order flow to end up with (suboptimal) inventory positions. Stoll (1978) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , and Stoll (1981, 1983) are the first to formalize that increased inventory risks require a compensation in terms of larger discounts and markups respectively to fundamental values. In more recent work that accounts for the decentralized trading in over-the-counter markets, Duffie et al. (2005) show that higher search costs and therefore limited outside options reduce investors' bargaining position and have them engage in transactions at larger discounts. Theoretical work that combines market making behavior and financing constraints shows that the latter can limit dealer liquidity provision to suboptimal levels (see, e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) ). Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlight that funding limits amplify shocks to asset values and ultimately lead to adverse liquidity spirals and reinforcing feedback loops. Within a search model, Weill (2007) shows that insufficient access to capital adversely affects dealers' ability to supply liquidity.
Dealers' willingness and ability to commit capital can be limited, which has been doc-umented empirically, e.g., in stock markets. Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) show that specialists' inventories and trading revenues have a significant impact on the width of bid-ask spreads. Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) find that price pressures increase with higher inventories reflecting dealers' unwillingness or inability to provide additional inventory capacity. The empirical literature on fire sales provides several examples in which transaction prices deviate from fundamental values (see, e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007) for open-end mutual fund redemptions in equity markets; Mitchell et al. (2007) for hedge fund redemptions in convertible bonds; Pathak et al. (2009) for foreclosures on real estate prices). Two papers in particular focus on the bond trading of insurance companies: Ambrose et al. (2008) use aggregate data to show that, in the absence of information effects (i.e., no stock price reaction to the news of a downgrade), there is not much price pressure among downgraded bonds. Price reversals only exist for bonds that contain negative information effects. They argue that there is less downward price pressure if dealers know that insurers are not informed traders. Using considerably more granular data on the insurance company level from 2000 to 2005 and focusing on bonds without information effects, Ellul et al. (2011) challenge the notation of Ambrose et al. (2008) . They find that insurers that are more constrained by regulation are more likely to immediately sell downgraded bond issues, which can lead to temporary price pressures. In particular, downgraded bonds held by constrained insurance companies experience significantly larger selling pressure and subsequent price reversals. Spiegel and Starks (2016) use TRACE data and propose a modified repeated sales methodology to study a large sample of downgrades covering over 8,000 bonds between the years 2002 to 2015. Upon a bond rating change between the investment and non-investment classification, they document significant negative (or positive) abnormal returns followed by partial recoveries that are consistent with microstructure models of limited dealer inventory capacities.
None of the above-mentioned papers, however, takes the role of dealer into account and explicitly considers the impact of their financial constraints on the fire sales. Thus, what sets my paper apart is to examine periods of increased selling pressure among insurance companies while focusing on the role of dealers and their ability and willingness to temporarily assume bond positions.
There are two papers that tackle related issues: First, using a proprietary dataset that contains all dealer identities, Han and Wang (2014) employ an event-study methodology and link dealer CDS spreads to transaction prices. They exclusively investigate the price and volume dynamics of defaulted corporate bonds. They document that defaults trigger more active trading, wider bid-ask spreads, and lower abnormal returns. They show that higher dealer CDS spreads are associated with a zero-balance exposure to defaulted bond issues, suggesting that more constrained dealers are less willing to take positions in defaulted bonds. My paper also investigates this notion but differs in a number of ways that adds a unique contribution: For one, and most importantly, I focus on the rating downgrade from investment to non-investment grades (excluding outright defaults), which represents the crucial rating event for regulated institutional investors, such as insurance companies and mutual funds holding close to 65% of outstanding corporate debt. I argue that the downgrade to speculative grades constitutes the actual stress event driving portfolio decisions for the most substantial fraction of the market. By the time an actual (expected) default occurs, institutional investors would have had to sell their positions in distressed bonds leaving the ground for specialized investors (e.g., unregulated hedge funds) for whom a default event does not need to trigger a sell off. For another, there are methodological differences between the papers. I am comparing bond returns to the portfolio return of a basket of matched bonds rather than marking to the market index (e.g., the Barclay's U.S. high-yield and investment-grade corporate bond indices). Within my sample, find the latter to over-/underestimate expected or normal bond returns respectively. Moreover, given the high degree of concentration in the market-making of a particular bond or issuer, I find that volume-weighting dealer constraints, as compared to simple averages as in Han and Wang (2014) is important and may explain differences in our results. Second, Bao, O'Hara, and Zhou (2016) have similar data access and study dealer liquidity provision in individual bonds following the downgrade to speculative grades. Specifically, they account for the regulatory changes following the implementation of the Volcker Rule. Exploiting dealer identities, their measure of dealer constraints is a distinction into Volcker-affected and non-Volcker-affected dealers. Within a difference-in-differences framework Bao et al. (2016) document reduced liquidity provision by Volcker-affected dealers and an overall reduction in the liquidity of downgraded bonds after the implementation of the Volcker Rule.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the sample construction and provides a general description of the data. Section 3 introduces the event study methodology and describes the use of matching portfolios. Section 4 starts with a graphical inspection of the bond price patterns around a downgrade and continues with the baseline results using cross-sectional regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on bond, market, and dealer characteristics. Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 hold robustness checks where I account for bonds' recent trading frequencies and insurer constraints respectively. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Sample Construction
The dataset primarily builds on four databases: First, the insurance companies' transaction data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The latter records the identity of the dealer engaged in each transaction. As reports are manually coded, counterparty entries need extensive cleaning with respect to name variations and misspellings. Importantly, with dealer identification comes the ability to link cross-sectional differences in dealer characteristics to abnormal returns surrounding a downgrade. Bessembinder et al. (2009) . The sample period stretches over 12 years and ranges from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2014 . The NAIC requires insurance companies to self-report security transactions in their financial statements. Each entry contains detailed transaction information including the CUSIP, the date and par value of the transaction, the (clean) price on a $100-par-basis, and the buy/sell indicator.
8 There are a number of steps required to process the raw data: A first major step is to filter bonds using bond-level characteristics (such as issue date, issuance size, coupon rate, credit ratings, option features, etc.) where I stick to the literature (e.g., Asquith et al. (2013) ). A second major round of filters apply to records with potential data issues concerning their price (missing, negative, or unreasonably large prices and sharp reversals), volume (trades <$1,000 or >50% of the issuance amount are dropped), or timing (trades on a bond's offering or maturity date, and trades on trading holidays). In the calculation of returns I take into account that the NAIC database exhibits a systematic error from a disaggregation of trades due to the reporting process (as pointed out by Asquith et al. (2013) ), which leads to an over-reporting in the number of trades and an under-reporting of the true price dispersion.
9 To correct for the disaggregation I group NAIC trades per bond CUSIP in case the trade execution date, counterparty, and buy/sell indicator are identical, and the difference in prices is smaller or equal to one cent (i.e., ≤ |0.01| on a $100-par-basis). 10 Lastly, the NAIC transaction data do not contain transaction time, which renders time ordering of trades impossible. Following Bessembinder et al. (2006) , in case of multiple trades per day I calculate returns based on the NAIC trade of the previous trading day.
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To specify the downgrade event I use FISD's rating history file, which details credit ratings and rating changes for each bond at each point in time. I use the lower of Moody's, S&P's, or Fitch's rating and, following Ellul et al. (2011) , define the rating change event as the date of the downgrade announcement by the rating agency that acts first. Specifically, multiple NAIC transactions match a single TRACE trade using CUSIP, trade execution date, price, and counterparty but taken separately show a discrepancy with the reported volume.
10 Not grouping on insurer type accounts for the possibility that an insurance company may book and report portions of the same trade under their respective divisions or subsidiaries.
11 In case there are multiple NAIC trades on consecutive trading days I opt for the last "institutional" TRACE trade (i.e., ≥$100,000) of the previous day to calculate returns. This difficulty only applies to a small number of trades though.
12 In comparison, the NAIC considers a bond to be in the non-investment grade classification if it no longer holds any investment-grade rating (i.e., corresponding to the date of the last rating downgrade). As in Ellul et al. (2011) I find the results to remain unchanged when defining the event as the last downgrade.
13 The median number of days between the first and the subsequent downgrade is 21 days. 14 After the classification change securities are deemed to fall into the non-investment grade classification if, in case of three rating agencies, the median rating justifies a downgrade, or, in case of two agencies, the lower rating justifies a downgrade. from constrained insurers even before all three agencies rate a bond non-investment grade. Third, for an insurance company holding on to downgraded bonds for too long may come at a reputational cost from regulators, rating agencies, and industry bodies (such as the NAIC), who require stringent (self-imposed) risk management practices and screen for investments in high-yield bonds as a source of potential credit losses.
With dealer identification comes the ability to link dealer characteristics to NAIC transaction data. For this, I determine a dealer's parent company and then gather CDS and credit rating data using Bloomberg and Datastream/CMA respectively. Using CDS spreads comes with three limitations: First, overall CDS coverage is not complete. While CDS contracts are available for bigger institutions there are often no contracts for smaller dealer boutiques or investment firms. Second, I do not have access to all data providers (e.g., the Markit database). Third, some series only start after July 1, 2002 , end before June 30, 2014 , have gaps, or show periods of stale prices (i.e., treated as missing if the spread does not update for more than two weeks). To retain the widest possible cross-sectional coverage with respect to dealer-specific inventory costs I fall back on long-term issuer ratings obtained from Moody's in case I do not have a dealer's CDS spread. Then, based on a dealer's rating, I impute a CDS spread. Specifically, I compute the average CDS spread on a given day for a given rating class (see Data Appendix) using the sample of dealers with both a CDS spread and a credit rating. I then map the average CDS spread per ratings class to the dealers for whom I lack a CDS spread. Out of the 74,108 NAIC trades in the eligible downgrade sample I am able to pair 55,385 (56,899) trades with a credit rating (CDS spread). Using imputed, rating-based average CDS spreads leaves me with data for 64,846 trades instead (corresponding to close to 100% of matched TRACE trades of the 10 most active dealers, and 98.46% (93.17%) of trades of the 25 (50) most active firms).
The value-weighted matching portfolios used as normal returns in the computation of abnormal returns are based on U.S. corporate bond trades reported to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's (FINRA) and disseminated through the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). I use Enhanced TRACE data, which includes both disseminated and non-disseminated transaction records and captures full trade sizes, starting from TRACE's initiation in July 2002 (but only available with an 18-month lag). To reduce the effects of infrequent, non-consecutive daily trading and to obtain a sizable sample within each portfolio partition, I impose less restrictive requirements with respect to bond characteristics than Bessembinder et al. (2009) . Specifically, I include corporate bonds of financial institutions, and all coupon types (with the exception of perpetual bonds) independent of their security level. In order not to suffer from a cross-correlation problem I make sure that the TRACE data does not contain any of the downgraded bonds under consideration in this study. Following the literature, I apply several data filters where the majority of filters involve eliminating erroneous trade reports such as cancellations, modifications, reversals, or duplicates (see Dick-Nielsen (2014) ; Asquith et al. (2013); Dick-Nielsen (2009) ).
In calculating bond returns within the event window (i.e., the period from -20 weeks before to +35 weeks after the downgrade) I require that bonds trade (i) at least once between weeks -20 and -1, and (ii) at least once between weeks 0 and +35. In addition, bonds that trades less than ten times during the sample period (i.e., highly illiquid bonds with potentially unreliable prices) are excluded from the analysis. These screens are similar to those applied in Ellul et al. (2011) but do not require trades outside the event window (as with matching portfolios I have no need for estimation windows).
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This leaves me with a final sample of 1,078 eligible downgrades in 968 distinct bonds that are downgraded from investment to speculative grades during the sample period. These bonds are issued by 423 issuers, accounting for 74,108 transactions with 375 distinct counterparties. Table 1 reports the annual number of downgrades from investment to non-investment grades over the sample period. There are two peaks in terms of the number of downgrade events: in the year 2005 when the two car manufacturers Ford and General Motors were downgraded from investment to speculative grades; and in the years 2008 and 2009 when, as a consequence of the subprime crisis, the credit ratings of many financial companies were lowered substantially.
Bond Characteristics
16 Table 1 further illustrates that as of the year 2010 the number of downgrades in the sample drops markedly. This decline is likely the result of two developments: First, following more stringent post-crisis risk management frameworks insurance companies appear to have cut down their exposure to high-yield bonds and those issues in imminent danger of being downgraded (CRO Forum, 2009 ). Second, after the crisis-induced high in corporate default rates the lessened volatility in the years 2010 to 2014 along with extraordinarily loose monetary policy showed comparably low corporate defaults both in numbers and volume (Ou et al., 2017) . Table 2 describes the summary statistics for the total NAIC sample, the sample of all bond issuers experiencing at least one downgrade in one of their bond issues, the sample of all downgraded bonds, and, finally, the sample of downgraded bonds that pass the trade screens and are thus eligible for the analysis. Close to 8.5% of bonds within the insurance company corporate bond universe are affected by downgrades, which represents roughly 12.3% of total trades within NAIC. These bonds are typically large with an average issuance size of around $400 million, having on average a 6.5% offering yield. In comparison to the typical insurer bond the average issue size of downgraded bonds is slightly smaller. As a consequence of the trade screens though the eligible downgrade sample contains slightly bigger bonds than the sample of all downgraded bonds. This suggests that after the uncertainty surrounding the downgrade has been resolved, the bonds in the eligible downgrade sample may be more liquid and frequently traded than other non-investment grade as well as typical high-yield bonds.
17 Given that the focus is to study the significance of dealer inventory constraints around downgrades, the overrepresentation toward more liquid downgraded bonds, although not ideal, will only help to strengthen the results if they show up for the more liquid bonds. As expected, insurers tend to hold long-term bonds where the average maturity is close to 12 years and the average bond age when traded on the secondary market is 3.5 for the total and 5 years for the downgrade samples respectively. Most bonds held and traded by insurance companies are investment-grade bonds and carry an investment-grade rating of 8 (i.e., a Moody's rating of Baa1 (upperto lower-medium grade)). Bonds that are to be downgraded hold a median rating of 9 (i.e., a Moody's rating of Baa2 (lower-medium grade)). This is within two steps of the non-investment-grade classification where in the period leading up to the official downgrade rating agencies oftentimes put the respective bond "on watch" in the sense that a downgrade may very well be anticipated by the market.
In terms of trading activity, the downgraded bonds trade more frequently and in larger size (i.e., higher turnover and number of trades) than the typical insurer bond in the total NAIC sample. This is likely due to the increased trading activity surrounding the downgrade. The median monthly turnover -the bond's monthly trading volume as a percentage of its issuance size -is 6.1% for downgraded bonds (4.3% for all bonds in the total NAIC sample), and the median number of trades per downgraded bond is 103 (80 for all bonds in the total NAIC sample). Insurance companies become net sellers in the period leading up to the downgrade (i.e., on average 50.1% of all trades are sells) and keep on selling heavily after the first downgrade announcement (i.e., on average 68.8% of all trades are sells). Given the higher sell frequencies before the downgrade it appears that the selling pressure in downgraded issues increases in the weeks before the official downgrade. This points to the fact that the risk management constraints imposed on insurance companies induce a collective need to divest downgraded bond issues.
Dealer Characteristics
A. CDS Spreads
Insurers' collective need to divest downgraded bond issues can lead to substantial selling pressure. In this case, bond dealers take the role of middlemen and temporarily absorb order-flow imbalances onto their own balance sheets. Importantly, establishing and maintaining such inventories requires financing where dealers strongly rely on short-term collateralized loans (so-called "repos"). As dealers' effective (short-term) funding costs are not publicly available I use their credit default swap (CDS) spreads. This proxy maintains cross-sectional variation and represents a plausible indicator of credit risk based on which lenders and risk managers evaluate financing terms and position limits. As higher credit risk increases monitoring concerns and prompts lenders to demand higher interest rates (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Rochet and Tirole, 1996 ) a dealer's CDS spreads appears as a suitable proxy for dealerspecific changes in funding costs. 18 In the subsequent cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns, the main empirical goal is to link differences in dealers' inventory financing constraints (as proxied by their CDS spreads) to price patterns surrounding a downgrade. The eligible downgrade sample holds 74,108 bond trades with 375 distinct dealer firms of which, in terms of transactions, the most-active five dealers account for 37.7%, the mostactive ten (25) dealers make up 63.3% (84.3%).
19 These dealers show a median (average) CDS spread of close to 33 (62) basis points (hereafter bps) with a standard deviation of 74 bps (i.e., a coefficient of variation of 1.19). Figure 1 depicts the daily average dealer CDS spread as well as the lowest and highest CDS quintiles over the sample period. Notably, the three series co-move strongly but show considerable cross-sectional variation in levels, clearly highlighted in the spread difference between the first (least constrained) and the fifth (most constrained) quintile. 20 The series closely reflect the aggregate market condition at the time (e.g., the 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crisis, and the years 2010-2012 of the European sovereign debt crisis). Overall, dealer CDS spreads appear to be a reasonable substitute for short-term funding rates 21 in that they increase during periods with heightened credit concerns.
B. Market Shares
Distinguishing bonds with respect to the trading activity of their market-making dealers offers another dimension for cross-sectional variation. In the subsequent cross-sectional analyses of cumulative abnormal returns, I use dealers' annual market shares in terms of trading volume in a particular bond (or issuer) to compute the Herfindahl index as a proxy indicator for their bargaining power and the amount of competition. These dealers show a median (average) market share of 6.2% (16.8%) at the bond-and a market share of 2.9% (10.9%) at the issuer-level where the standard deviations are given by 2.9% and 2.9% respectively (i.e., coefficient of variations of 1.44 and 1.77). To illustrate the cross-sectional differences in dealers' trading activity the panel in Figure 2 reports the share in monthly trading activity in the downgraded bonds in terms of trading volume for the most active 5, 10, 25, and 50 dealer firms. The most-active five dealers account, on average, for 50% of volume highlighting the striking concentration of trading activity among only a small number of dealers handling a major share in the overall trading of downgraded bonds. The most-active 10 firms make up just below 70% of the volume, the most-active 25 firms close to 95% of the volume, and the most-active 50 firms for close to 100% of the volume in downgraded U.S. corporate bond markets.
Event Study Methodology
Matching Portfolios
To investigate whether cross-sectional differences in liquidity providers' financing constraints contribute to the price pressures surrounding a downgrade I employ an event study methodology. Specifically, I compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to examine the return patterns of downgraded bonds and relate them to bond and dealer characteristics using cross-sectional regressions. In spirit of Bessembinder et al. (2009) , abnormal returns are measured using a matching portfolio approach where one compares the return of a particular bond i at time t with the 21 Dealer CDS spreads show a significant correlation (+0.25) with the TED spread (i.e., the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rates), which is generally used as a proxy for credit risk in the banking sector and closely related to financial institutions' short-term funding markets.
average return on a portfolio of bonds at time t that matches bond i along a finite number of relevant risk factors (generally proxied for by observable bond characteristics). For a long-horizon event study, as is the case in this paper, constructing a benchmark return that equals the portfolio return on a small group of bonds with similar characteristics appears appropriate as it assures a reliable risk adjustment over time. In an effort to appropriately match bonds along the most relevant risk dimensions I control for two risk factors: the default risk (proxied by bond ratings) and the maturity risk of a bond (proxied by timeto-maturity). This yields 10 matching portfolios -five rating classes (AAA to AA-, A+ to A-, BBB+ to BBB-, BB+ to B, B-to C) times two time-to-maturity groupings (1 to 5 years (52 th percentile), and over 5 years). Matching along two dimensions is motivated by the balance between ensuring roughly similar portfolio sizes (with a sufficient number of trades) and creating matching portfolios that offer a reasonably close and reliable risk adjustment on a daily basis. For robustness, I also compute a set of matching portfolios based on a bonds' credit rating and its amount issued where the latter characteristic proxies for potential liquidity risks of high-yield bonds (Houweling et al., 2005) . 22 For brevity and because the results are qualitatively similar I focus on the findings using rating/time-tomaturity matched portfolios. The results using rating/issued amount matched portfolios are relegated to the Appendix (important differences will be pointed out in the main text though). In comparison to a market return model, which is typically sufficient for short-horizon event studies, matching portfolios are segmented on finer partitions and therefore constitute a more reliable risk adjustment than broader market indices (e.g., the Barclay's U.S. high-yield and investment-grade corporate bond indices). This appears to be critical, since the assumption that bonds of different ratings load equally on aggregate bond returns is inaccurate at least within my sample. A univariate regression of bond on index returns produces an average β on the investment-grade (high-yield) index of 1.2 (0.74) before (after) the downgrade. That is, a "market return model" (where β = 1 by assumption) would underestimate (overestimate) expected or normal bond returns. Intuitively, the loading on the index should depend on a bond's default risk relative to the average default risk of the index. The majority of bonds hold a BBB-rating (i.e., the lowest investment-grade rating) in the weeks before the downgrade and a BB+ rating (i.e., the highest high-yield rating) in the weeks after the downgrade, which explains the over (under) exposure on the respective indices. As an alternative to matching portfolios, one could also use a market-model approach 22 In case of rating/issued amount matched portfolios I group bonds into five rating classes and a set of liquid ($1 to $500 million issuance size; i.e., the 65 th percentile) versus illiquid bonds (above $500 million issuance size).
to estimate bond-or portfolio-specific loadings on various risk factors. For instance, Ellul et al. (2011) estimate a bond's exposure to changes in the government bond yield, in both the investment-grade and the high-yield corporate spreads, as well as the issuer and aggregate stock market returns using bond portfolios. Since a considerable number of issuers do not have stock price data employing their particular estimation methodology would unnecessarily restrict the sample size though. Still, as a robustness check, I replicate my results employing their approach using a slightly modified regression setup. I replace an issuer's stock return with the return of the relevant SIC industry portfolio (using the Fama-French 49 industry classifications). This exercise does not change the overall conclusions of the paper and in fact produces comparable CAR patterns (see Figures 5, 6 , and 7 in the Appendix).
Bond trades are usually irregularly spaced: some bonds trade on a daily basis, but the majority of bonds trade infrequently. Thus, focusing solely on daily-traded bonds when creating the matching portfolios would only reflect the return on the most liquid bonds and thus potentially omit illiquidity return premia. Likewise, excluding non-consecutive trades drastically reduces the number of bond trades per portfolio. Hence, to keep a sizable sample I include both consecutive and non-consecutive bond trades. In case a bond trades nonconsecutively I linearly interpolated its prices in order to calculate a daily bond return.
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To reduce the effects of highly infrequent trading within a bond I require that trades are 15 or fewer trading days apart (96 th percentile). Finally, on a given trading day each matching portfolio must contain at least two bond returns. Otherwise, I compute the portfolio return on trading day t as a weighted average of the trading returns from days t − 1, t, and t + 1. 24 These requirements can lead to artificial smoothing in the returns of the matching portfolios, which, although not ideal, should not further affect the analysis of CARs. Lastly, the composition of each portfolio may change from day to day, which is partly mitigated by using value-weighted returns. Arguably, the matching portfolios can be understood as a simplified special case of the approach proposed by Spiegel and Starks (2016) . It is a simplification to the extent that I do not explicitly estimate daily returns using a dummy variable approach. And, it is a special case in the sense that bond returns contributing to a portfolio on a particular trading day are generally equally-weighted. In comparison, I am matching based on a bond's rating and its time-to-maturity while Spiegel and Starks (2016) group on a bond's yield and its industry classification. Importantly, as in Spiegel and Starks (2016) , the approach yields an average univariate regression coefficient, β, of one when regressing bond returns on the matching portfolios.
Computing Abnormal Returns
In the calculations of bond returns I use simple returns (reported in %). That is, bond i's return at trading day t is calculated as
where P i t (P i t−1 ) is the clean price of bond i on trading day t (t − 1).
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I denote the simple return on a corresponding matching portfolio over the event period t − 1 to t as NR i t (i.e., the normal or expected bond return for R i t ). Then, the abnormal return, AR i t , for bond i on event day t is calculated as the difference between the observed return and the normal bond return:
Following Ellul et al. (2011) I define the downgrade event as the first downgrade announcement and the event period as the period from event weeks −20 to +35. When tracing abnormal returns over weeks −20 to +35, I constrain the sample to bonds that trade (i) at least once between weeks −20 and −1, (ii) at least once between weeks 0 and +35, and (iii) at least ten times during the sample period (i.e., excluding highly illiquid bonds with potentially unreliable prices). To obtain cumulative abnormal returns CAR i [t 1 ,t 2 ] for event period [t 1 , t 2 ], I aggregate AR i t for each bond by event week and accumulate weekly CAR between event weeks t 1 and t 2 . In case of multiple trades per bond i on trading day t and given the lack of time stamps in NAIC I use the median abnormal return of the particular day. Finally, I normalize CARs for each bond to zero at week −20.
I calculate the average (median) cumulative abnormal return,
, as the average (median) of the normalized CARs across all available bonds in the each event week. That is, as in Ellul et al. (2011) , ACARs and MCARs only contain the CARs of those bonds that actually trade in a particular event week. Consequently, the number of bonds used in the calculation of the aggregate statistics varies from week to week. Due to the potentially large, negative outliers surrounding a downgrade ACARs tend to be more noisy whereas the MCARs are more robust. Since the mean better reflects the experience of insurers in aggregate though I report both statistics for the remainder of the paper.
Results
Return Patterns Around The Downgrade
The empirical goal is to establish whether or not the financing constraints limiting liquidity providers' risk-bearing and inventory capacities negatively affect bond price patterns around a downgrade. I start with a graphical inspection of CARs. Using the volume-weighted average CDS spread of the five most-active dealers per bond and issuer respectively, I compare CARs for bonds with average dealer CDS spreads above the median (i.e., constrained dealers with high inventory financing costs) with those for bonds with average dealer CDS spreads below the median (i.e., unconstrained dealers with high inventory financing costs). Figure 3 plots ACAR and MCAR patterns at the bond-level whereas Figure 4 plots them at the issuer-level. I find a striking pattern of large price drops and reversals around the downgrade, similar to the pattern documented in the literature (see, e.g., Spiegel and Starks (2016) , Ellul et al. (2011) ). However, dealer constraints appear to have a substantial impact on these price patterns.
Insert Figures 3 and 4 here
Consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis, those bonds with dealers showing high credit risks and thus potentially more severe inventory financing constraints experience substantially larger return deviations, as exhibited by more negative and abrupt declines in abnormal returns. This provides graphical support for the idea that higher inventory financing costs limit dealers' risk-bearing capacities making them less willing to establish growing inventory imbalances without substantial price markdowns.
In these plots three observations stand out. Consider, for example, Figure 3 : First, CARs are increasingly declining from as early as week −20 where ACARs (MCARs) have dropped by 6.8% (5.3%) before the first downgrade announcement. This suggests that markets are likely anticipating adverse rating changes (e.g., due to the deterioration of issuer fundamentals) resulting in strong negative bond price momentum. The price decline steepens as the downgrade event approaches suggesting that the speed with which capital moves out of the distressed bonds is likely increasing. Since bond prices should incorporate the probability of a downgrade, the more rapid drop in returns appears to be are result of growing order-flow imbalances rather than changes in the prediction of issuer credit risks. Notably, before the actual downgrade the bond returns of constrained and unconstrained dealers do not diverge significantly.
Second, after the downgrade CARs continue to fall and reach their lowest point in the short period before event week +5. At this point MCARs have dropped by close to 6.9% while ACARs have fallen by 9.7%. By this point the bonds of constrained dealers have dropped significantly more than those of unconstrained dealers. That is, bond of dealers with higher financing constraints are experiencing larger price declines and thus appear to be transacting positions at larger markdowns. These return differences are significant in particular in the period immediately following the downgrade (see Tables 3 and 4) .
Third, in the period from event week +5 to +10, ACARs show signs of modest price reversals moving upward by 1.8%. MCARs, on the other hand, more or less stabilize and improve by 1.4% up to week +25. Clearly, the reversals are steeper and thus faster for bond of unconstrained dealers suggesting that because these dealers can finance trading positions at lower costs they are able to rebalance inventories faster at potentially lower transaction costs than their constrained competitors. For the period after event week +15 the return patterns generally tend to stabilize for the following 20 weeks where bond prices have dropped by roughly 6.5% (6.1%) in terms of ACARs (MCARs). Notably, in this period the return differences between bonds of constrained and unconstrained dealers is not significant different from zero anymore (see Tables 3 and 4) . Overall, these return patterns are consistent with the findings of Spiegel and Starks (2016) who show that downgrades lead to significant negative abnormal returns to be followed by partial prices recoveries.
As reported in Figures 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix I find similar CAR patterns (i.e., in terms of timing and magnitude) when using the modified regression-based approach of Ellul et al. (2011) , the simple market-return model used in Han and Wang (2014) , or when using rating/issued amount matched portfolios. All plots are consistent with the notion that temporary risk-bearing limits depress bond prices beyond fundamentals until inventory imbalances abate and the negative price pressure partially dissipates. Importantly, the effects are clearly in line with the financial constraints hypothesis where bonds handled by constrained dealers are associated with substantially more negative and abrupt declines in abnormal returns and slower reversals.
To check whether the return differences between bond of constrained and unconstrained dealers illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 are indeed statistically significant I test the significance of CARs over 5-week periods before and after the downgrade. Tables 3 and 4 hold these CAR statistics. I find the CAR difference between bonds with constrained dealers and those with unconstrained dealers to be statistically significant in particular in the period immediately following the downgrade.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here   Consider Table 3 , which is measuring dealer constraints at the bond level: In the downgrade week the MCAR difference is given by -3.73% (t-stat= −2.37) highlighting their statistical and economic significance. In the weeks following the downgrade (i.e., weeks +1 to +15) this return difference remains significant at -3.63% on average. For ACARs the results are similarly negative and given by -3.21% (t-stat= −1.65) in the downgrade week where I tend to obtain strong statistical significance only as of week +5. That is, between weeks +5 to +20 the ACAR return difference is strongly significant and given by -6.64% (t-stat= −3.16) on average. Notice that these CAR differences in bonds of constrained and unconstrained dealers are strongly negative and highly significant particularly within the short period after the downgrade while they tend to be statistically insignificant in weeks before and long after the downgrade. This suggests that cross-sectional differences in dealers' financing constraints matter exactly when selling pressure is the highest. And, that the negative price effects tend to be eventually comparable in magnitude as selling pressure dissipates and inventories constraints abate over time.
Measuring dealer constraints at the issuer instead of the bond level, the CAR statistics are slightly more noisy such that I obtain less significance but similar in terms of timing and magnitude (see Table 4 ). Market making at the issuer level entails handling more trading volume. In principle, hedging adverse price movements of held inventories within the same issuer (e.g., long downgraded bond B 1 and short another investment-grade bond B 2 of issuer B) may allow dealers to partially avoid some of the inventory (price) risks. For this reason one could expect that market-making at the issuer level increases dealers' risk-management and hedging possibilities. However, as dealers receive no capital relief from hedges within the same bond issuer under Basel rules such within-issuer price hedges come at the cost of increased capital and financing needs. As a consequence, handling increased order-flow at the issuer level may intensify inventory effects for constrained dealers in particular under intense selling pressure.
Overall, downgrades from the investment to the non-investment grade classification appear to lead to permanent devaluations of bond prices, which, through the perspective of microstructure models, reflect lasting changes in investors' expectations. The fact that CARs partially reverse in the long run suggests that the collective need to divest downgraded bonds may, at least in the short-term, be limited by dealers' inventory capacities. That is, downgrades tend to depress bonds prices beyond fundamental values (i.e., prices overshoot their new long run equilibrium value) where part of the overly negative price effects eventually dissipate over time as aggregate dealer inventories revert to their long-term averages. Importantly, the above analysis highlights that these return patterns are different for bonds handled by constrained versus those handled by unconstrained dealers and that these differences appear to be consistent with the idea that dealers' financial constraints limit their risk-bearing capacities around a downgrade.
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Downgraded Bonds
In what follows I run bond-level cross-sectional regressions to relate CARs to bond, trading, and dealer characteristics. Beside CAR The regression equation relating the cross-section of CARs to bond, trading, and dealer characteristics is given by
In equation (3) 
, and B i hold dealer -specific attributes that proxy for the market presence and the inventory constraints of the most-active five dealers, a set of measures capturing bond i's trading activity, as well as general bond -specific characteristics. Specifically, the vector D i [t 1 ,t 2 ] holds the following regressors: Relative to the downgrade date and corrected for the trading within the event window I construct a bond's annual Herfindahl index where a higher index points to a reliance on a small number of key market makers, potentially rendering the bond trading imperfectly competitive.
26 To make the measure comparable across bonds (issuers) and time I compute the ratio of each respective Herfindahl index over the median Herfindahl index per calendar year. In case of an industry-wide sell-off of a downgraded bond issue one would expect the selling pressure to be partially alleviated if it can be shared among more (unconstrained) market makers. Similarly, using primary market data, I identify a bond's (issuer's) lead underwriters and compute their market share (in %) per event year where higher figures around the downgrade would point to a sustained issuer-dealer relationship and a potential commitment to market-making for a particular bond (issuer). Lastly, and of primary interest, I construct the weekly volume-weighted average CDS spread of the five most-active dealers per bond and issuer respectively. 27 For comparison across bonds (issuers) and time I then compute the ratio of weekly dealer CDS averages over the median dealer CDS average per calendar week and accumulate the resulting ratio between event weeks t 1 and t 2 . Consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis, bonds with more constrained dealers as their most-active market-makers should experience substantially larger price pressure, as exhibited by more negative and abrupt declines in abnormal returns.
contains bond-specific trading characteristics computed between weeks T 1 = −75 to T 2 = −20 preceding the downgrade. For each bond, insurers' net trading volume (in $ millions) using NAIC transactions is calculated as the buy volume minus the sell volume during weeks −75 to −20, divided by the bond issue size.
28 A positive net volume identifies the insurance industry as a net buyer where larger figures could suggest more severe selling pressure. Using TRACE data, I compute the total non-insurer trading volume of a bond (in $ millions) over weeks −75 to −20 as the sum of all TRACE trading volume minus the equivalent NAIC trading volume where the difference is then divided by the bond issue size. This measure captures potential buy-side capital where more frequent and higher trading of non-insurance companies may suggest a potentially larger client base. The latter could make it easier for dealers to offset trading positions after a downgrade. This argument, however, is only valid if the available capital is free to take on non-investment grade bonds (i.e., most pension and mutual funds are subject to regulation too). Capturing the ability to readily offset trading positions with another customer in a particular bond in a short period of time, I compute the average time (in minutes) between consecutive customer-dealer trades within TRACE in the weeks −75 to −20. In a bond with high interest from buy-side clients one would expect less time between customer-dealer trades. In contrast to this, I compute a proxy for an active inter-dealer market that captures the share (in %) of inter-dealer trades relative to all trades (i.e., customer-dealer plus inter-dealer trades) in TRACE in the weeks −75 to −20. The need for the inter-dealer market may point to a lack of buyer capital (e.g., because of small dealer client base). Turning to the inter-dealer market is one way of ensuring that positions do not end up as inventories but are passed along to other dealers who might show a better fit for a particular inventory risk. Captured in B i , I control for a range of bond characteristics. For instance, the natural logarithm of a bond's offering amount (in $ million) 29 and the natural logarithm of a bond's age (i.e., the time since issuance) measured at the time of downgrade. Also, I include a dummy that flags bonds if they do not have seniority in order of repayment (i.e., all forms of junior and subordinate debt). Similarly, I include a dummy for bonds with credit enhancements (e.g., guarantees, letter of credit, etc.). As a measure of rating dispersion I use the maximum rating difference measured in the week before t 1 (i.e., the difference between the highest and the lowest rating in case of multiple agencies; in case of only one agency this measure is zero by definition). Finally, I include a dummy, δ In the particular regression settings it makes sense to de-mean (de-median) all independent variables in order to give the regression constant the interpretation of the mean (median) cumulative abnormal return. Thus, all variables have to be interpreted as deviation from the mean (median) such that I will report the marginal effect of a particular regressor in terms of a one standard deviation increase.
The error term i in equation (3) is assumed to be zero on average and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Econometric issues may be the following: As captured in Table 1 , the majority of firms have only a handful of bonds affected by a rating event while there is a small number of large issuers with a lot of bonds being downgraded in close proximity of time.
31 For one, this may lead to a (potentially) skewed distribution of downgrades across issuers. Given that the focus is to study the significance of dealer inventory constraints, the overrepresentation of issuers with multiple downgraded issues, although not ideal, will strengthen the point that insurers' collective need to suddenly divest downgraded issues can temporarily overexert dealers' risk bearing and inventory capacities. Actually, median regressions as well as using subsamples (e.g., excluding Lehman Brothers) suggest 29 For matching portfolios based on bond ratings and issue amount the natural logarithm of the (remaining) time-to-maturity at the time of the downgrade is used instead.
30 For instance, Ellul et al. (2011) find the year 2002 to be the most likely to result in fire sale prices since insurers are found to be more "impaired" and thus likely to heavily sell downgraded issues. that the results are not driven by only a handful of issuers. For another, downgrades may be clustered (i.e., downgrades in close proximity with potentially highly correlated bond and dealer characteristics) and have overlapping event windows, which violates the assumption of independent observations and leads to inflated t-statistic. To overcome these issues I correct the standard errors by clustering observations at the issuer×downgrade-year level.
Baseline Findings
With the bond-level cross-sectional analysis I want to confirm that the impact of dealers' inventory constraints on CARs documented in the graphical analysis is indeed valid after controlling for various bond and trading characteristics. Table 5 reports the average and median regression estimates for the full, the pre, and the post event period for abnormal returns computed against a rating/time-to-maturity matched portfolio and dealer constraints measured for the five most-active dealers at the bond-level. Table 6 holds the regression results when dealer constraints are measured at the issuer-level.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here To begin with, the regression results confirm the observed patterns of the graphical inspection: dealers' inventory financing constraints (as proxied by their CDS spreads) have a negative, economically meaningful, and highly significant effect on CARs over the entire event window (i.e., weeks −20 to +35). Even though OLS estimates are more pronounced than the median regression results, the negative impact on CARs remains consistently significant across both estimation procedures. Consider the regression results for the whole event period [-20,+35] where dealer constraints are measured for the five most-active dealers at the bond-level: the average (median) estimate of −12.11% (−5.82%) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of a bond's volume-weighted average dealer CDS spread over the median dealer CDS spread at the time is associated with a significant negative average (median) CAR of 3.55% (1.71%).
I find the negative impact on CARs to be stronger when measuring dealer constraints at the issuer instead of the bond-level. Table 6 suggests that for a one standard deviation increase the average (median) estimate of −17.39% (−7.04%) implies a negative CAR of 4.24% (1.71%). This suggests that bonds and particularly issuers with constrained dealers (i.e., an average volume-weighted dealer CDS spreads above the median) exhibit more negative cumulative abnormal returns around a downgrade.
Comparing the pre-with the post-event window when measuring dealer constraints at the issuer-level, the empirical evidence suggests that the negative impact of dealers' inventory constraints on CARs is stronger in the weeks following the downgrade (i.e., weeks 0 to +35). Using OLS, the coefficients on the dealer CDS ratio are −6.90 for the pre-event and −10.29 for the post-event window. Moreover, in the median regressions, the coefficient on the dealer CDS ratio is of lower magnitude and does not obtain statistical significance in the period leading up to the event (i.e., weeks -20 to -1). This indicates that inventory financing constraints appear to matter more after the rating change occurs, the insurance industry is constrained to selling the bond issue, and dealers' inventory limits become binding. When dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level this effect is much less pronounced. Overall, these findings provide strong support for the financing constraint story: bonds handled by dealers with higher inventory financing constraints and therefore limited riskbearing capacities show a higher price pressure around a downgrade. The effect on CARs is negative and substantially larger for bonds with dealers showing high credit risks, which suggests that constrained dealers are less willing to establish growing inventory imbalances without substantial price markdowns.
Among the remaining dealer characteristics the market share of a bond's lead underwriters (LU) has a positive, significant and economically meaningful effect on ACARs in particular in the pre-event period (i.e., weeks -20 to -1). The coefficient of 0.13 implies that a one standard deviation increase results in an increase of ACARs of approximately 1.15%. This suggests that in the weeks leading up to the downgrade higher involvement of lead underwriters in the market-making of a bond is associated with less price pressure (e.g., due to a valuable issuer-dealer relationship resulting in an implicit commitment to a bond). This appears to be in line with a finding by Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) who show that bonds become more illiquid if two particular lead underwriters, potentially still serving as market-makers in secondary market trading, are facing financial distress (i.e., Bear Stearns in March 2008, and Lehman Brothers in September 2008). Admittedly, when measured at the issuer level or using median regressions the effect of LU market share on CARs is not statistically significant anymore.
A bond's Herfindahl ratio (i.e., the Herfindahl index scaled by the median Herfindahl index at the time) has a significant and negative effect on ACAR in the pre-event period (i.e., weeks -20 to -1). This effect is significant both at the bond-and the issuer-level where coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase leads to decrease in ACARs of 1.00% and 1.35% respectively. That is, a reliance on a small number of key market makers, potentially rendering the bond trading imperfectly competitive, decreases CARs in particular in the weeks leading up to the downgrade. Using median regressions, this effect does not obtain statistical significance.
Over the entire event-window the regression constants are significant and well below zero throughout all specifications. As reported in Table 5 , the average (median) constant is −11.26% (-4.53%). Comparing the pre-and the post-event windows, the constants show a noticeable pattern: CARs in the pre-event period are significantly lower. This is the case because the post-event period is associated with return reversals where overly negative price pressure is partially reversed through positive returns after event week 10. Using median regressions, the constant for the weeks following the downgrade, 0.59%, is even slightly positive.
Unreported in the Tables 5 and 6 However, I find the interaction effect between the crisis period and the financial industry dummy to be very negative and strictly different from zero at any reasonable level of significance. The coefficients suggests that bond ACARs (MCARs) of financial firms are depressed by 9.87% (15.18%) for a one standard deviation increase over the entire event period. The effect is similar in magnitude for estimates in Table 6 . That is, bond downgrades of financial companies during the 2008 subprime crisis period are associated with highly negative CARs. This appears to be, among other things, driven by the Lehman Brothers default in September 2008 but still holds (in unreported results) for subsamples excluding Lehman Brothers.
Considering the remaining control variables in Table 5 , I find that only a small number of regressors is associated with significant and economically meaningful effects. Among the bond characteristics, credit enhancements (e.g., guarantees, letter of credit, etc.) significantly reduce price pressure such that bonds with enhancement features fair better and, for a one standard deviation increase, are associated with a positive ACAR of 2.08%. In a similar spirit, I find that juniority in order of repayment (i.e., all forms of junior and subordinate debt) points toward strongly negative ACAR. However, the effect does not obtain statistical significance. The variable rating dispersion is associated with a positive effect on ACARs. That is, wider disagreement between agencies, measured as the difference between the highest and the lowest available rating, leads to lower price pressure, especially leading up to a downgrade. Comparing the pre-with the post-event window coefficient, a one standard deviation increase in rating dispersion increases ACARs by 3.74% and 1.54% respectively. Thus, rating dispersion appears to capture the strength of a sell-off and thus the decline of returns in the period leading up the event, which is likely associated with insurers being less pressured into selling downgraded issues quickly. Using median regressions, the effects of the various bond controls oftentimes obtain less statistical significance. I find bond age to have a negative and significant effect on MCARs where a one standard deviation increase reduces MCARs by 0.90% over the entire event window.
Among a bond's trading characteristics, the coefficient on the share of inter-dealer trading is significant and negative and tends to decrease ACARs by 1.07% for a one standard deviation increase. Higher inter-dealer trading can point to a dealer's inability to offset a position within her client base. Then, instead of building up inventory or increasing the search efforts with the client base a dealer may turn to the inter-dealer market. But this may come at a cost. As such, the negative coefficient on the share of inter-dealer trading suggests that limited buy-side capital increases price pressure. Similarly, the average TRACE time stamp difference between customer-dealer trades obtains statistical significance and depressed MCARs by 0.72% for a one standard deviation increase. More time between customer-dealer trades can be understood as another indication that dealers find it hard to offset a particular bond position quickly within their client base and therefore require larger markdowns around a downgrade. Both findings suggests that bonds that show a lack of buy-side capital experience more price pressure. Hence, bonds that, from a dealer's perspective, are more illiquid and harder to offset come with larger markdowns. In what follows I investigate the aspect of expected liquidity further by running cross-sectional regression on liquidity subsamples.
Accounting for Recent Bond Liquidity
On top of inventory price risks, high-yield bond inventories are costly in terms of financing and require higher risk-based capital charges. In the process of acquiring downgraded bond positions, dealers' expected inventory costs are therefore a function of the expected illiquidity of a particular bond position. For instance, Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) find that, as consequence of dealer search efforts, inventory positions in high-yield bonds are oftentimes quickly offset in order to mitigate inventory risks and costs associated with holding inventory positions. Thus, dealers' propensity to offset trading positions within a short period of time rather than to establish inventories is, among other things, determined by a bond's liquidity. Besides bond characteristics such as the amount issued and bond age, which have been shown to be good proxies for liquidity by Houweling et al. (2005) , 32 a bond's recent (in)frequency of trading, measured by a bond's non-zero trading days, provides a good proxy for expected near term trading activity (see, e.g., Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) ). Typically, the number of non-zero trading days will be higher for bonds with a larger buy-side interest rendering these bonds more liquid.
Thus, in the subsequent analysis, I re-run the cross-sectional regressions while exploiting the non-zero trading days measure. Besides including the variable as another control variable, I form subsamples of the data by splitting all downgraded bonds into a group of liquid and one of illiquid bonds. In case the number of non-zero trading days in the weeks −75 to −20 preceding the downgrade is less (more) than 72 a bond is categorized as illiquid (liquid). The cutoff point for non-zero trading days is the median. Tables 7 and 8 hold the regression results.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 here To start with, the results are robust to the direct inclusion of the non-zero trading days liquidity measure as another control variable in regression equation (3). The liquidity proxy yields a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient of 0.017 (0.019) with t-stat= 1.21 (t-stat= 1.32) when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level (issuer-level). This translates into a increase of CARs of 1.27% (1.36%) for a one standard deviation increase in a bond's trading frequency. That is, frequently traded and thus more liquid bonds show higher ACARs over the full event window. Importantly, the coefficient on the dealer CDS ratio is not affected by the inclusion and remains at −12.40 with t-stat= −3.63 at the bond-level (−17.71 with t-stat= −4.20 at the issuer-level). As reported in Table 8 median regression coefficients are also robust (i.e., the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on Dealer CDS ratio does not change markedly) to the inclusion of the non-zero trading days variable. The latter yields a positive coefficient of 0.018 (0.020) with t-stat= 1.55 (t-stat= 1.75) when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level (issuer-level), which translates into a increase of CARs of 1.40% (1.32%) for a one standard deviation increase in a bond's trading frequency.
The positive effect of higher (recent) bond liquidity on CARs is also picked up in the subsample regressions: the regression constants across the subsamples indicate that illiquid bonds show a highly significant negative ACARs over the entire event window (i.e., weeks −20 to +35) whereas the constant is not significant for liquid bonds. Consider, for example, the LoLiq specifications when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level: the ACAR is −11.35% (-11.73%) for illiquid (liquid) bonds where the constant in the low liquidity subsample is highly statistically significant, t-stat= −9.18, while the one in the high liquidity subsample does not obtain statistical significance, t-stat= −1.60. Using median regression, I find all constants to be insignificantly different from zero across both subsamples.
The subsample regression results are consistent with the financing constraint story: bonds handled by dealers with higher inventory financing constraints show lower CARs around a downgrade. The effect remains negative, and economically meaningful. However, the subsample regression coefficients suggest that CARs of liquid bonds are more negatively affected by dealers' inventory financing constraints than illiquid bonds. The estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the dealer CDS ratio decreases ACARs by −4.86% (−1.75%) for liquid (illiquid) bonds when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level. When measured at the issuer-level, the impact on ACARs is given by by −6.15% (−1.93%) for liquid (illiquid) bonds. Using MCARs this effect is more moderate and given by −2.72% (−1.20%) for liquid (illiquid) bonds when dealer constraints are measured at the issuer-level. One explanation for this finding could be that the employed backward-looking liquidity proxy does poorly in predicting future liquidity following a downgrade. In fact, volume and frequency based measures may pick up high levels of recent liquidity exactly because of the trading activity of regulated buy-side clients such as insurance companies and mutual funds. Upon a downgrade, however, these investors become subject to regulatory constrains that drastically limit their trading activity in the affected bonds going forward. Hence, expected liquidity may be substantially lower after a downgrade, especially if a large fraction of a dealer's client base is not allowed or willing to hold the downgraded issues anymore. Then, offsetting these trading positions requires higher search efforts than before the downgrade. On the other hand, for a recently illiquid bond the appropriate means to offset the position, e.g., with specialized investors, might already be in place. Hence, if a constrained dealer is overwhelmed with sell orders and builds up inventory in a recently liquid but soon to be illiquid downgraded bond issue the differences in the above estimates could be justified.
On this note, the return difference between liquid and illiquid bonds will be reduced when the latter show more frequent inter-dealer trading. The inter-dealer market allows dealers to pass along trading positions to other dealers who are indicating a better fit for the particular trading position. Only the subsample of illiquid bonds exhibits significantly lower CARs when there is a higher share of inter-dealer trades in total trading. The coefficients imply that for a one standard deviation increase in the variable ACARs of illiquid bonds decrease by −1.39% when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level (−1.29% at the issuer-level). Using median regressions, this effect on illiquid bonds is of similar significance but less pronounced: MCARs increase by −0.66% (−0.64%) when dealer constraints are measured at the bond-level (issuer-level). This suggests that whenever a dealer cannot resell illiquid bond position with specialized investors within her client base and turns to the inter-dealer market instead these bonds experience more substantial price pressure. Increased inter-dealer trading appears to be an indication of smaller buyer interest in a particular bond issue such that price markdowns associated with illiquid bonds appear to be affected by a trade-off between retaining inventory risks and search efforts. Ellul et al. (2011) show that more constrained insurance companies are more likely to sell at least part of their holdings of a downgraded bonds. This oversupply can amplify selling pressures especially in periods when the insurance industry as a whole is more constrained. To control for insurer constraints I take into account three insurer-specific variables as employed by Ellul et al. (2011) in Section 3.1 "Probability of selling around the downgrade".
Accounting for Insurer Constraints
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First, the holdings of the entire insurance industry in a particular bond (in %) measured in the quarter before the downgrade. Second, the holdings of property insurance companies (in %) in the quarter before the downgrade in order to account for the fact that property insurance companies, in comparison to life insurers, face relatively short-term and more uncertain liabilities, which prompts them to divest downgraded bonds more rapidly. Third, as a direct measure of regulatory constraints, the average NAIC risk-based capital ratio (RBC ratio) of all insurers holding the respective bond. This ratio is defined as the ratio of total adjusted capital to NAIC risk-based capital. RBC is the minimum amount of capital that the insurance company must maintain based on the inherent risks in its operations. Higher RBC ratios represent better capitalization and ratios below 2.0 trigger supervisory interventions. As documented in Ellul et al. (2011) this proxy is a strong predictor of a bond's selling probability upon a downgrade.
As . This reduces the sample from roughly 882 feasible downgrades to 234 downgrades. As Ellul et al. (2011) only include bonds that exhibiting zero-issuer-stock returns upon the downgrade this subsample only investigates downgrades in absence of information effects. All bond with insurer-specific characteristics are senior debt which means I drop the juniority dummy. The years from 2002 to 2005 when cross-sectional differences in dealer CDS spreads are at their lowest (see Figure 1 ) and the quintile spread is at merely 30 bps. During this period markets become increasingly more liquidity close to its all-time high in the year 2006 (see Bao et al. (2011) ) and dealers start scaling up their balance sheets with cheap short-term funding (Rosengren (2014) ). The empirical strategy is straightforward: I include the RBC ratio as another independent variable in my cross-sectional regression to check whether the coefficient on dealer financing constraints retains its strength and significance. Table 9 holds the regression results.
Insert Table 9 here
The results in Table 9 are consistent with the financial constraint hypothesis: bonds with more constrained dealers experience significantly lower CARs around a downgrade where the average effect is more pronounced than the median effect. Consider specification 2, the estimate of −13.55 implies that for a one standard deviation increase in the dealer CDS ratio decreases ACARs by −2.55%. Likely due to the lack of power given the limited number of observation, I obtain less statistical significance. Using OLS, the coefficients are still highly significant when measuring dealer constraints at the issuer-level and slightly less significant at the bond-level. In median regressions, the effect has the right sign and economic magnitude but the effect is not significant anymore. Overall, the impact of dealers constraints on CARs appears robust to the inclusion of insurer constraints. Upon a downgrade, dealer constraints, on average, still amplify downward price pressure in downgraded bonds.
The insurer-specific variables do not obtain statistical significance throughout all specifications. The direction of the coefficients on insurer holdings and the RBC ratio are in line with expectations. Higher insurance holdings result in more negative CARs. Also, bonds held by better capitalized insurers experience less price pressure. Surprisingly, the coefficient on property insurer holdings is positive suggesting that bonds with higher property companies holding them show increasing CAR.
Among the remaining control variables, a bond's age tends to significantly depress CARs within this subsample. A one standard deviation increase in bond age decreases ACARs by 3.64%. Surprisingly, rating dispersion before a downgrade now has a significantly negative impact on CARs leading to a decrease of 3.64% for a one standard deviation increase in the variable. This result is likely driven by the fact that before July 2005 (i.e., within this particular sample period) Lehman Brothers' corporate bond indices based their index constituency on the first downgrade leaving no room for any dispersion in ratings. That is, with the downgrade positions need to be sold, which ultimately increases price pressures. Similar to the findings in Subsection 4.2.2, a one standard deviation increase in the share of inter-dealer trading in a downgrade issue decreases ACARs by 1.36%. The coefficient flagging financial firms is positive and significant, which implies an increase in ACARs of 3.83% for a one standard deviation increase. The effect predominantly captures the trading in the Ford and General Motors subsidiaries General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) respectively, which handle the auto financing and loans in support of their parent companies. Thus, in comparison to the average CAR, which is around −9%, financials firms show significantly higher ACARs within the event period.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of dealers' financial constraints on fire sales of corporate bonds by insurance companies. As insurance companies operate under regulations that constrain their risk-taking capacities, a bond downgrade from investment-grades to non-investment-grades can induce a collective need to immediately and collectively divest downgraded bond issues (see, Ellul et al. (2011) ).
Since regulated insurance companies as a group hold over a quarter of all outstanding corporate bonds, the forced selling of downgraded bond issues temporarily generates substantial order flow imbalances. Upon a downgrade, corporate bond dealers provide liquidity by absorbing these temporary order-flow imbalances onto their own balance sheets. Dealers' ability to take the role of middlemen is closely linked to the ease with which they can establish and maintain inventory positions. Speculative bond inventories hold substantial inventory price risks, require higher risk-based capital charges, and are costly in terms of financing. At least in the short-term, a dealer's financial constraints can create temporary limits in her risk-bearing capacities. As the cost of liquidity provision increases, a dealer can become increasingly hesitant to take on additional inventory, and may quote smaller quantities at less attractive prices.
I show empirically that dealers' financing constraints (as proxied by dealers CDS spreads) have a statistically and economically meaningful negative impact on the bond price patterns surrounding a downgrade. Consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis, bonds that are handled by constrained dealers experience substantially larger return deviations, as exhibited by more negative and abrupt declines in abnormal returns. The empirical evidence suggests that higher inventory costs limit dealers' risk-bearing capacities making them less willing to establish growing inventory imbalances without substantial price markdowns. These findings are robust to controlling for various bond, market, and dealer characteristics as well as when using median regressions. This table holds regression coefficients of CARs on bond, trading, and dealer characteristics using median regressions and accounts for insurer constraints. All Insurer Holdings (Property Holdings) capture the entire (property) insurance industry's holding in a bond in % a quarter before the downgrade. RBC Ratio is the average NAIC risk-based capital ratio of all insurers holding a bond. Higher RBC ratios represent better capitalization; ratios below 2.0 trigger supervisory interventions. CARs are in % and based on rating/time-to-maturity matched portfolios. The event is the first downgrade announcement from investment to non-investment grades. The sample period is A.1 Appendix 
